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Abstract 
 
We consider which readily observable characteristics of individual stocks (e.g., option 
implied volatility, accounting data, analyst data) may be used to forecast subsequent 
extreme price movements. We are the first to explicitly consider the predictive influence of 
option implied volatility in such a framework, which we unsurprisingly find to be an 
important indicator of future extreme price movements. However, after controlling for 
implied volatility levels, other factors, particularly firm age and size, still have additional 
predictive power of extreme future returns. Furthermore, excluding predicted extreme 
return stocks leads to a portfolio that has lower risk (standard deviation of returns) 
without sacrificing performance.   
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1. Introduction 
Traditional studies often seek out firm characteristics or tendencies that may be linked 
to higher expected returns. While such studies are numerous, and many other works  
examine the forecasting of future variance levels, markedly less research investigates the 
question of whether firms experiencing returns of high magnitude (positive or negative) 
may be identifiable ex ante. We consider whether firms exhibiting extreme returns have 
common characteristics. If so, can extreme return firms of future periods be predicted? 
Furthermore, can portfolio variances be reduced by eliminating firms likely to have 
extreme future returns without adversely affecting portfolio performance?   
Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006, 2009) examine the pricing of idiosyncratic risk in 
the cross-section. They find that portfolios consisting of firms with the highest 
idiosyncratic risk are characterized by negative alphas and significantly underperform a 
portfolio of stocks with the lowest idiosyncratic risk. Blitz and Van Vilet (2007) study the 
possibility of actively managing portfolios to benefit from the inclusion of low volatility 
stocks. Using U.S., European, and Japanese stocks they document a 12% spread between 
low and high volatility portfolios and argue that, in practice, portfolio managers should add 
low volatility stocks as a separate asset class.  Although the advantages of low volatility 
firms have been documented, many portfolio managers still overweight high volatility 
stocks.  We invoke a new approach in this paper. Rather than attempting to pick “winners” we 
seek to identify extreme return firms ex ante and remove them from a value-weighted 
market position similar to that held by many passive investors. The ability to identify firms 
more apt to experience extreme future returns could provide lower risk portfolios.   
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Stock volatility level serves as perhaps the most intuitive firm characteristic that may 
aid in the predictability of extreme stock returns. Poon and Granger (1993) outline 
numerous publications on the methods by which volatility can be forecasted. They demonstrate that the majority of research on predicting volatility favors a stock’s implied 
volatility from option prices, unsurprising given that implied volatility reflects active 
perceptions of future levels of volatility.  Information available in companies’ financial statements may also indicate extreme 
future equity returns. Accounting variables, fundamental analysis, and trading 
characteristics help predict returns in past research on firm size and book-to-market ratios 
(Fama and French, 2002), trading volume (Campbell, Grossman and Wang, 1993), price 
momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), dividend yields (Hodrick, 1992), accruals 
(Sloan, 1996) and earnings predictions (Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993). We consider the 
impact of such measures on the likelihood that firms will exhibit extreme future price 
movements. 
Reinganum (1988) and Beneish, Lee and Tarpley (2001) use unique, directionally-
oriented approaches that consider market-based signals in order to identify potential 
extreme price movements. Among this group of 12 market-based signals, Beneish, Lee and 
Tarpley (2001) find that relatively younger firms with lower market capitalization, lower 
stock prices, higher trading volume, lower sales-to-price ratios, lower analyst coverage, and 
higher return volatility are more likely to exhibit large movements. The authors, however, 
do not consider the potential impact of implied volatility as a predictive measure. Also, 
whereas Beneish, Lee and Tarpley (2001) utilize their prediction scheme as the first stage 
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of a two-stage process seeking out profitable firms, we attempt to decrease portfolio 
variance by eliminating firms likely to experience large price movements.  
Dong, Duan and Jang (2003) propose a different application of the variables presented 
by Beneish, Lee and Tarpley (2001), as well as a neural network model that decreases 
necessary variables, and thus increases sample size. This process reveals that only a subset 
of the explanatory variables used by Beneish, Lee and Tarpley (2001), namely market 
capitalization, price, age, and the presence of a recent loss in income or decline in sales, are 
useful. Again, however, implied volatility is not utilized. Dong, Duan and Jang (2003) find 
that smaller firms, firms with lower stock prices, and younger firms are more likely to 
experience extreme price movements. As an additional measure, we also consider analyst 
forecast dispersion as a potential predictor of extreme returns. Differences of opinion 
regarding future firm performance might indicate a wider range of potential prices that a 
stock may reach in a given period. 
In this paper, we utilize a probit regression framework in hopes of identifying the 
characteristics of firms with extreme future price movements. Implied volatility from 
options, a new consideration in this line of research, strongly predicts future extreme price 
movements. It is highly significant in a Fama-Macbeth framework and enters every annual 
probit regression, regardless of selection criteria. Implied volatility adds greatly to our 
successful identification frequency of future extreme return firms. Given that implied 
volatility arises from market prices, one possibility is that all predictability of extreme 
future returns may be captured by these volatility levels. However, we further find firm 
size and age frequently have additional explanatory power. Younger and smaller firms are 
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more likely to experience extreme future returns, even when the implied volatility 
predictor is also included.  
Utilizing an ex ante approach to identify firms with extreme price movements 
significantly improves the success of identification above random levels. When we remove 
predicted extreme price movers from a widespread portfolio, the day-to-day variation of 
the portfolio declines significantly over the study period while the overall returns of the 
portfolio do not suffer. In fact, when we delete predicted extreme return stocks from a 
position which otherwise mimics the value-weighted equity market, performance over the 
past 15 years actually improves. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 Our sample period is 1996 through 2010. We collect implied volatility data from 
Optionmetrics.1 Christensen and Prabhala (1998) and Li (2002) describe the usefulness of 
at-the-money options, and those near maturity, due to the strong liquidity of such options. 
With strong liquidity, fewer possibilities for mispricing exist, and such options also more 
fully reflect market expectations for short-term volatility. The results presented in this 
paper are based on the implied volatilities of available call options nearest at-the-money 
status expiring mid-February of the following year (approximately seven weeks after 
positions are formed since liquidity for such options is relatively high). We collect equity 
returns from CRSP, and this data is used to identify “extreme” (high magnitude) returns in 
                                                          
1 Results are robust to the choice of option maturity, moneyness and type (put implied volatility yields results 
similar to calls). 
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the following year2, including bankruptcy or bankruptcy-like delistings from equity 
exchanges. We identify delisted firms via CRSP delisting codes. As in Dichev (1998) and 
Brockman and Turtle (2003), CRSP codes 400 and 550-585 are classified as bankruptcy-
type delistings. We gather trading volume (shares traded in the past year), current stock 
price, and market capitalization data from CRSP.  We exclude firms with stock prices below 
$5, as well as firms that do not trade on the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX. We utilize the natural 
log of firm age (in months), price, volume (in millions of shares) and size (in millions of 
dollars) for extreme return prediction as we posit the marginal impacts of these variables 
are likely to decrease as their values increase. We calculate firm age, in months, based on 
the initial appearance month in CRSP.  For firms appearing in CRSP prior to January 1962, 
we record January of 1962 as the initial month. We expect smaller, lower price, and 
younger firms will be more likely to experience extreme future returns. However, in a 
regression framework, we note that no additional explanatory power may be added if 
implied volatility is an all-encompassing metric describing future stock behavior. 
We gather analyst forecast data from IBES.  We calculate forecast dispersion, based 
on the most recently available data on December 31st of each year, as the standard 
deviation of initial earnings estimates for the most recent quarter. We expect those firms 
with higher forecast dispersion to experience more extreme future returns as a greater 
level of uncertainty exists regarding their prospects.3  We gather book value of equity from 
Compustat in order to construct the book-to-market ratio. We also take research and 
                                                          
2 Alternatively, we considered one-month and six-month return horizons and found similar links to the 
predictor variables discussed.  
3
 The difficulty of effectively shorting stocks has dropped over time, particularly given the introduction of Single Stock Futures (SSFs) in 2002, midway through our sample period. Thus, the motivation for Miller’s 
(1977) conjecture that forecast dispersion may be indicative of overvalued stocks may be less relevant 
moving forward. The use of forecast dispersion to predict non-directional extreme movement seems, to us, 
perhaps more relevant moving forward. 
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development data from Compustat, as firms making greater efforts to develop new 
technology or techniques may be prone to greater swings in firm value. We utilize the most 
recently available Compustat data as of each December 31st, and we compute the book to 
market value ratio based on the market value from those dates. 
 We require observations to have data for all variables (with the exception of R&D 
expenditures for which missing values are set to 0), major exchange status, and share price 
greater than $5, and this results in a sample of large, established firms relative to the 
universe of all CRSP observations. Requiring implied volatility data and a minimum of two 
analysts following the firm in IBES further limits the sample considerably. Our final annual 
samples range in size from 1,100 to 1,600 firms per year. We clearly acknowledged that 
when we refer to the explanatory power of “age” and “size”, and when we note that “younger” and “smaller” firms are more likely to exhibit extreme returns, these findings are 
determined after mandating the inclusion of implied volatility and forecast dispersion as 
explanatory measures.  
At first, this may seem troubling, but while our sample restrictions result in a wide 
deletion of firms, the market capitalization of our remaining sample represents over 85% 
of the CRSP database total market capitalization each sample year (and over 90% in the 
majority of years). The small sizes of the omitted firms imply that their deletion results in 
only a small impact on the value-weighted portfolio returns we examine. We seek to 
improve upon the performance of a typical, value-weighted, market mimicking portfolio by 
deleting a few firms which have a high likelihood of exhibiting an extreme return in the 
following year, and our final sample allows us to consider this question genuinely. 
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We consider the power of a number of explanatory variables to predict the 
likelihood of a firm experiencing extreme returns over the next year. We perform probit 
regressions for the occurrence of extreme price changes over the next calendar year based 
on explanatory variables observed on the final trading day of the preceding year or over 
the course of the preceding year. To determine our regression coefficients from the probit, 
we classify firms which prove to be in the highest 3% or lowest 2.5% of realized returns in 
the following year as having extreme returns. Additionally, we classify firms which delist 
from the CRSP database due to bankruptcy or bankruptcy-type reasons in the following 
year as having extreme returns. Given that roughly 0.5% of firms (meeting our data 
requirements) are delisted per year, on average, for failure-type reasons, we choose the 3% 
upper threshold and the 2.5% lower threshold of returns to give relatively equal numbers 
of high and low extreme movers each year.  Results are robust to various threshold levels 
for extreme returns (for example, the highest and lowest 2% of returns and bankruptcy 
delistings, or the highest 2% and lowest 1.5% of returns and bankruptcy delistings, etc.). 
We employ these classifications, along with the previously presented explanatory 
variables, to estimate the probit regression specification: 
 
Pr(Ij) = (+(BM) + (Disp) + (IV) + (Size) + (Age) + (Vol) + (RD) + 8(Price))   
+ j                                (1)  
     
Where Pr is the probability the indicator variable Ij = 1 (indicating an extreme return 
observation) and is the cumulative normal distribution function. Equation 1 is 
estimated on an annual basis. BM is the book-to-market ratio formed based on the available 
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data on December 31st of each year, Disp is the analyst forecast dispersion on this date, IV is 
the implied volatility of the call option closest to at-the-money status which expires in 
February of the following year, Size is the natural log of market capitalization (in millions of 
dollars), Age is natural log of firm age in months, Vol is the natural log of the trading 
volume, i.e., the average number of shares traded daily over the previous year (in millions), 
RD is the research and development expense of firms in the previous year based on the 
most recently available data on December 31st of each year, Price is the natural log of firm 
price, and j is the error term.4  
 We calculate Fama-Macbeth coefficients using annual probit regression coefficients, 
and Newey-West standard errors of these annual coefficients are used to calculate t-
statistics. We also estimate probit coefficients on an annual basis utilizing both backward 
and stepwise selection criteria to determine the robustness of the utility of various 
predictors. 
 We must take care to employ a fully ex ante approach in order to predict extreme 
returns. We conduct all regressions based on predictors observable on December 31st of a 
year and the equity returns of the subsequent year. We estimate coefficients from a given 
year and use these coefficients, along with the new data for each predictor variable, to 
predict extreme return status in the following year.5 Using this method, there are no look-
ahead biases in our portfolio construction; each rebalance is possible via information 
readily available to fund managers every December 31st. For example, we conduct a probit 
                                                          
4
 Additional explanatory variables, such as number of analysts following the firm and the sales loss indicator 
of Beneish, Lee, and Tarpley (2001) were considered but held little additional explanatory power. Only 
potential predictors which entered the backward or stepwise regression specifications for at least two of the 
14 annual specifications were kept for purposes of presentation. We also consider industry effects, but they 
have little predictive power.  
5
 The performance of portfolios which are rebalanced on a more frequent or less frequent basis may serve as 
an exercise for future research. 
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regression linking the probability of extreme returns in 1998 to end-of-1997 explanatory 
variables. We then use these coefficients, along with explanatory variables observable on 
December 31st, 1998, to predict which firms will have extreme returns for the year 1999.  
We designate the firms with the highest 6% of extreme return probabilities as “predicted 
extreme” firms.  We then track these firms to determine the effectiveness of our predictive 
methodology.6 We present two statistics. First, we present the “recognized” percentage, 
which is based on the number of extreme movement firms that were correctly predicted, ex ante. Second, we present the “realized” percentage, which is calculated based on the 
number of predicted extreme movement firms which indeed exhibit extreme price 
movements. These percentages are typically similar; however, the variation in the number 
of bankruptcy delisting firms from year to year results in some divergence.  We also 
compare the performance and variability of annual, value-weighted portfolios which do 
and do not include predicted extreme movement firms. While earlier works considere how 
low risk portfolios may improve the value of investors, ours is the first paper, of which we 
are aware, designed to improve portfolio performance by predicting extreme magnitude 
stocks ex ante and adjusting holdings accordingly. 
 
3. Results 
                                                          
6 We must, of course, make the classifications of whether or not firms are “predicted extreme” ex ante. Future 
one-year returns data are unavailable for a few firms. If the reason for unavailability is a delisting due to 
bankruptcy or bankruptcy-like reasons, as denoted by CRSP, then we classify the firm, ex post, as an “actual” 
extreme movement firm. If, however, a firm cannot be accurately traced for the following year for other 
reasons, we omit the observation from the sample (for both predicted extreme and non-extreme firms). While 
6% of firms are predicted to be extreme movement firms, ex ante, these omissions result in the final sample of firms having a “predicted extreme” ratio slightly different than 6%. 
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 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics after dividing the sample based on whether 
extreme returns were experienced by firms in the following year.  Firms in the highest 3% 
or lowest 2.5% of equity returns, or delisting for bankruptcy or bankruptcy-like reasons, 
are considered extreme return firms.   
 
(Insert Table 1) 
 
As expected, and consistent with prior literature, extreme return firms are smaller 
size firms, younger firms, and have lower stock prices.  For all these variables, mean and 
median differences between extreme and non-extreme return firms are significant at the 
1% level.  Mean and median implied volatility and analyst forecast dispersion are larger for 
extreme return firms relative to non-extreme returns.  These differences are also in the 
predicted direction, and significant at the 1% (5%) level for implied volatility (forecast 
dispersion).  Trading volume is lower for extreme return firms, but the difference is only 
marginally significant.  Research and development costs are higher for non-extreme return 
firms.  Differences for both means and medians are significant at the 1% level.  At first, 
these findings seem contrary to our intuition, but volume and R&D costs are thus far 
unadjusted for firm size.  It is important to test the power of all variables to predict 
extreme returns in a multivariate framework as correlations between many variables are 
significant.  We accomplish this through the use of probit analysis.   
Table 2 presents Fama-Macbeth probit coefficients. The coefficients of implied 
volatility, age, and size are significant at the 1% level. The signs of these variables are as 
expected. Younger firms, smaller firms and firms with higher implied volatilities are more 
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likely to experience extreme price movements in the following year. The coefficient for 
volume is now positive and marginally significant, consistent with prior literature. After 
inclusion of size in the regression framework, the coefficient for R&D costs is insignificant, 
contrary to the implications of Table 1. 
 
(Insert Table 2) 
 
Also, in Table 2, we present the results of backward and stepwise selection 
procedures.  We report the percentage of annual probit models for which each explanatory 
variable enters (for stepwise selection) or remains (for backward selection). We find 
implied volatility is useful as a predictor of extreme returns in each year, while age and 
firm size are each useful in roughly half of the annual specifications. This is true for both 
the backward and stepwise procedures.  Price was also significant in a number of annual 
regressions; however, the sign of the significant price coefficient was not always consistent 
with Fama-Macbeth results (unlike for the age and size predictors). 
Table 3 presents prediction accuracy results.  On the last day of each year we use the 
regression coefficients, estimated from the previous year’s probit regression, along with 
the values of each predictor available on that day, to predict which firms will exhibit 
extreme returns in the following year.7  We identify firms in the highest 6% of probit 
estimates as “predicted extreme return” firms.  We classify the percentage of actual 
extreme return firms correctly found in the “predicted” sample in the given year as “recognized”. We classify the percentage of predicted extreme return firms confirmed to 
                                                          
7
 Alternatively, the average of the coefficients estimated by the probit models to explain extreme return status 
in the prior three years was considered. Results were similar. 
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actually be extreme return firms as “realized”. For example, in 2008, of the 92 firms that 
were in the top 3% or bottom 2.5% of returns, or delisted for bankruptcy or bankruptcy-
like reasons, 12 were predicted to be extreme movers. This results in a 13.04% “recognized” level. Of the 80 firms (remaining after data-driven omissions) predicted to be 
in the extreme return sample, those 12 firms were confirmed to be extreme return firms. 
This results in a 15.00% “realized” level.  
 
(Insert Table 3) 
 
To illustrate the relevance of the findings of Table 3, suppose that 1,000 stocks were 
analyzed in a given year. Of these, if 6% were picked at random this would be 60 stocks. Of 
this random sample, we would expect to find 6%, or 3.6, to be correctly predicted as extreme movement firms by random chance. The random “recognized” and “realized” 
statistics would each be 6%. As can be seen in Table 3, the “realized” and “recognized” percentage levels are notably higher than 6% in each year’s observations. In actuality, we 
reject a chi-square test for independence, each year, at the 1% level, with the exception of 
1997.  
Improved ex ante identification of extreme movement firms may provide portfolio 
management benefits. Low risk portfolios have garnered increased attention in recent 
literature due to benefits provided for investors, and the question remains what 
improvements may arise from our approach. Table 4 shows the performance of annual 
portfolios that include all sample firms as well as the performance of portfolios which 
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exclude predicted extreme return firms. The annual return of each portfolio is presented, 
as is the annualized standard deviation of the daily returns of each portfolio. 
 
(Insert Table 4) 
 
The daily standard deviation of returns for the entire period is significantly smaller, 
at the 1% level, than the daily standard deviation of returns for the full sample.  For the 
entire sample period, the portfolio that excludes predicted extreme movement firms has a 
5.70% annual geometric mean with an annualized standard deviation of 24.63%, while the 
portfolio that includes all sample firms has an annual geometric mean of 4.99% with an 
annualized standard deviation of 26.08%. Along with the reported superior returns for the “no extreme” sample for the full sample period, we note that in 11 of 14 years, the portfolio 
which excludes predicted extreme movement firms exhibits both lower day-to-day 
variation and a superior return. Thus, it does not appear that the lower variation from an 
approach deleting predicted extreme movement firms comes as a result of sacrificing 
superior returns.8 The approach also does not result in inferior returns in times of market 
distress. The four sample years with the poorest market returns: 2000, 2001, 2002 and 
                                                          
8
 As an alternative to the portfolios discussed herein, we consider the performance of an equally weighted full 
sample portfolio. When predicted extreme firms are weighted at their value levels (which shrinks the weights 
of most predicted extreme firms) and other stocks are then equally weighted, conclusions similar to the 
value-weighted case arise. The return levels of the full sample, equally weighted portfolio and the sample 
which first value weights predicted extreme firms are similar; however, the variation of the latter portfolio is 
significantly reduced, both annually and over the full sample period. 
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2008 actually saw superior returns (along with the customary reduced daily variation) for 
the portfolio which omits predicted extreme movement firms.9 
 
4. Superiority over One-Sided Predictions 
 Given the demonstrated ability to predict firms likely to have extreme returns in the 
following year and the risk reduction benefits of excluding these firms, we next attempt to 
identify firms likely to have positive extreme returns and negative extreme returns 
separately. If we can frequently successfully identify firms likely to have extreme negative 
returns, it would be more sensible to exclude only these firms from a portfolio10, or we may 
choose to invest only in firms predicted to have large positive price movements.   
 
(Insert Table 5) 
 
In Table 5 we report Fama-Macbeth probit results separately for predictions of large 
positive and large negative return firms. We consider those in the highest 6% of returns for 
the year to be “extreme positive return firms” and firms in the lowest 5.5% of equity 
returns or delisting for bankruptcy or bankruptcy-like reasons to be “extreme negative 
return firms”. For the positive model, coefficients of implied volatility, firm age, and 
                                                          
9
 Finally, we note that the market capitalization of the excluded firms represents, on average, 2.3% of the 
overall market capitalization of our sample. For the minimum (maximum) year, this figure is 0.9% (3.4%). 
The predicted extreme return portfolio has a CAPM beta of 1.30, based on monthly market returns over the 
full sample period. 
 
10
 This assumes that firms with predicted extreme negative movement are not low (or even negative) beta 
firms, which could thus offer diversification benefits to investors. In our sample, this assumption is valid.  
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forecast dispersion are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 5% levels, respectively.  Younger 
firms and firms with higher option implied volatilities are more likely to experience 
extreme positive outcomes in the future year, consistent with our earlier results. Firms 
with lower forecast dispersion experience extreme positive returns in the following year 
more frequently. Smaller firms are also more likely, at the 5% significance level, to realize 
extreme positive returns in the following year. 
For the negative model, we find coefficients of implied volatility and age to be 
significant at the 1% level and the size coefficient to be significant at the 5% level. Younger 
firms, smaller firms, and those firms with higher option implied volatilities experience 
extreme negative future outcomes more frequently. In general, these results support those 
from the model predicting all extreme returns firms, presented in Table 2.   
We next test the ability of these models to correctly identify extreme positive and 
negative return firms. We present these results in Table 6.  As in the Table 3 analysis, at the 
beginning of each year we use the regression coefficients for the positive and negative 
extreme return models, estimated via the previous year’s probit regressions, to predict 
which firms will exhibit extreme positive or negative returns in the following year. We 
classify the percentage of extreme return firms correctly predicted in the given year as “recognized”.  We classify the percentage of predicted extreme return firms confirmed to 
be extreme return firms as “realized”.  We identify the top 6% of firms from each 
specification as predicted positive (negative) extreme returns firms.    
 
(Insert Table 6) 
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Both models underperform the non-directional model in identifying extreme return 
firms.  The positive extreme return model has recognized and realized percentages of 
9.72% and 9.79%, respectively, compared to 15.71% and 16.76% for the non-directional 
model.  The negative extreme return model has recognized and realized percentages of 
9.62% and 9.48%, respectively. The two-sided approach greatly outperforms the one-sided 
approach. We posit that the modeling approach we utilize performs well in forecasting the 
second moment of returns but is not particularly successful at forecasting the first 
moment.11 Hence, the primary improvement to portfolio selection from our approach 
comes about through decreased variation. 
To briefly demonstrate the importance of implied volatility in predicting extreme 
returns we also present the overall success of the original, non-directional model when 
implied volatility is excluded as a potential predictor.  Recognized and realized percentages 
decrease to 8.84% and 9.43%, respectively, when implied volatility is excluded from the 
model.  We find this decline in model utility to be unsurprising given the extreme 
significance of the implied volatility variable; however, the significant prediction abilities of 
other variables (notably, in results not shown, age and size) deter the identification 
frequencies from declining to random levels. 
We also present the annual and overall results for a portfolio which deletes those 
firms predicted to be in the lowest 5.5% of returns for the following year or to delist due to 
bankruptcy or bankruptcy-like reasons. If such a portfolio were to offer superior 
profitability or lower variation, then the approach of omitting all predicted extreme 
                                                          
11
 This is somewhat akin to types of modeling done by Barra (a brand of MSCI Inc.), which seeks to explain the 
second moment of returns with selected predictors.  
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movement firms would not be optimal.12 The results, analogous to Table 4, are shown in 
Table 7. 
 
(Insert Table 7) 
 
 The annual geometric mean return of the approach deleting only predicted extreme 
negative firms is slightly higher than that of the approach deleting all predicted extreme 
movement firms, but this improvement is by only 18 basis points (5.88% for the 1997-
2010 period, vs. 5.70%, as seen in Table 4). More strikingly, the one-sided approach 
severely compromises the reduction in variation seen in Table 4. The drop in annualized 
daily standard deviation shrinks to only 0.50%, as opposed to the significant decline of 
1.45% noted in Table 4. Only 10 of 14 individual years have drops in variation under the 
approach which removes only predicted extreme negative firms (as opposed to all 14 years 
in Table 4), and only 4 of these drops are statistically significant at the 5% level (as 
opposed to 11 in Table 4).  
It appears that an approach which attempts to eliminate all extreme movement 
firms, in order to reduce portfolio variation, outperforms an approach which seeks 
superior returns, along with reduced variation, by excluding only predicted extreme 
negative movers. Moreover, while the portfolio which eliminates only predicted extreme 
negative firms demonstrates a slightly higher return than the dual-direction approach, 
most investors will not view this increase as enough to compensate for the much smaller 
improvement in terms of variation. 
                                                          
12
 A portfolio including only predicted extreme positive movement firms has a marginally improved return 
but an unsurprisingly high daily standard deviation. 
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5. Conclusion 
 We seek to contribute to the literature analyzing stock returns through a unique 
approach: examining the predictability of extreme returns. We consider a combination of 
implied volatility, accounting data, and analyst forecast data in order to identify firms that 
are more likely to have extreme future returns. When we exclude firms predicted to have 
extreme future price changes, day-to-day portfolio variation is significantly lowered 
without sacrificing return levels. In all but two years of our 14 year study, the portfolio that 
excludes stocks predicted to have extreme movements has significantly lower day-to-day 
variation with improved returns. This finding also applies to the overall 14-year period.  
Attempts to identify positive or negative extreme return firms separately do not result in 
improvements as notable as those predicted by the non-directional model. We find a firm’s implied volatility, size, and age have power to predict future 
extreme price movements. As hypothesized, implied volatility is positively related to the 
probability of extreme price movements while size and age are negatively related.  Implied 
volatility is the most consistent and powerful predictor of future extreme price movements, 
but its information may be supplemented by additional considerations. The most relevant 
prior study in this area is that of Beneish, Lee and Tarpley (2001) who determine that 
extreme movement firms can be somewhat identified, ex ante. Their study, however, 
focuses on the distinction between the characteristics of predicting returns for those firms 
which are extreme performers and those which are not. Like Beneish, Lee, and Tarpley 
(2001), we consider firm size and age to be potentially relevant predictors of a firm having 
extreme returns. However, our inclusion of implied volatility, the most important measure 
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in the prediction framework, is a new contribution to the literature. This measure changes 
the predictability of extreme returns considerably.  
Rather than picking winners, we focus on lowering portfolio variation by removing 
potentially extreme moving firms from holdings. We report considerable, statistically 
significant success based on our two-sided approach. One-sided approaches do not provide 
the same degree of predictability of extreme returns. 
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Table 1:  Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics after dividing the sample according to whether firms experience extreme returns in the following year.  Firms 
in the highest 3% or lowest 2.5% of equity returns, or delisting for bankruptcy or bankruptcy-like reasons, are considered extreme return firms.  BM is 
the book-to-market ratio, Disp is the analyst forecast dispersion, IV is the implied volatility of the call option closest to at-the-money expiring in 
February of the following year, Size is the log of firm size (in millions of dollars), Age is log of firm age in months, Vol is the log of the average number of 
shares traded daily in the previous year (in millions), RD is the research and development expense of firms in the previous year in millions of dollars, 
and Price is the log of firm price.  The sample period is from 1997-2010, based on information available the final trading day prior to each new year. For 
mean differences, significance levels from t-statistics are indicated.  For median differences, significance levels from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are 
indicated.   
 
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Mean Median
BM 0.707 0.655 0.455 0.683 0.623 0.322 0.024 0.032 *
Disp 0.063 0.020 0.422 0.036 0.010 0.125 0.027 ** 0.010 **
IV 0.704 0.633 0.344 0.512 0.470 0.266 0.192 *** 0.163 ***
Size 5.888 4.038 1.256 13.590 13.209 1.337 -7.702 *** -9.171 ***
Age 4.382 4.406 0.963 4.918 4.944 0.885 -0.536 *** -0.538 ***
Vol 0.288 0.139 0.611 0.335 0.144 0.668 -0.047 * -0.005
RD 35.220 5.770 45.440 118.77 9.230 58.294 -83.550 *** -3.460 ***
Price 2.519 2.401 0.882 3.014 2.775 0.718 -0.495 *** -0.374 ***
n = 1120 n = 17829
Realized Extreme Realized Non-Extreme Difference
 
 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2:  Fama-Macbeth results and inclusion frequency of predictors 
This table presents coefficients and t-stats of the Fama-Macbeth procedure which conducts annual probit 
regressions of the likelihood of a firm being in the highest 3% or lowest 2.5% of equity returns or delisting for 
bankruptcy or bankruptcy-like reasons.  The sample period covers prediction of extreme returns from 1997 
through 2010 with predictor variables measured on the last trading day of the previous year. Additionally, 
the backward and stepwise selection criteria are utilized to determine which of the regressors enter annual 
probit regressions. For the 14 years of returns data, the frequency of inclusion for the various predictors in 
each selection methodology, based on 10% significance thresholds, are listed. BM is the book-to-market ratio, 
Disp is the analyst forecast dispersion, IV is the implied volatility of the call option closest to at-the-money 
expiring in February of the following year, Size is the log of firm size (in millions of dollars), Age is log of firm 
age in months, Vol is the log of the average number of shares traded daily in the previous year (in millions), 
RD is the research and development expense of firms in the previous year in millions of dollars, and Price is 
the log of firm price. 
  Coefficient t-value Backward Inclusion  Stepwise Inclusion  
Intercept -0.282 (-0.55)     
BM -0.115 (-0.13) 42.9% 42.9% 
Disp 0.477 (0.95) 21.4% 21.4% 
IV 2.417 (8.84) 100.0% 100.0% 
Size -0.398 (-7.40) 57.1% 50.0% 
Age -0.362 (-4.77) 57.1% 57.1% 
Vol 0.133 (1.76) 35.7% 21.4% 
RD -0.003 (-1.38) 14.3% 7.1% 
Price 0.091 (0.82) 57.1% 57.1% 
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Table 3: Predicting extreme returns based on previous year's coefficients 
This table presents accuracy results for predicting firms that will have the highest 3% and lowest 2.5% of annual equity returns (or delist for 
bankruptcy or bankruptcy-like reasons) for the years listed. At the beginning of each year, the probit regression coefficients from the previous year are 
used to predict which firms will exhibit extreme returns in the following year. The percentage of extreme return firms that were correctly predicted to 
be so in the given year are classified as “recognized”.  The percentage of predicted extreme return firms that exhibit extreme price movements are 
classified as “realized”.   
1997 Actual No Actual Yes    1998 Actual No Actual Yes    1999 Actual No Actual Yes  
Predicted No 978 58   Predicted No 1231 68   Predicted No 1308 74 
Predicted Yes 51 5   Predicted Yes 59 13   Predicted Yes 67 10 
Recognized 7.94% Realized 8.93%     Recognized 16.05% Realized 18.06%     Recognized 11.90% Realized 12.99%   
2000 Actual No Actual Yes    2001 Actual No Actual Yes    2002 Actual No Actual Yes  
Predicted No 1132 69   Predicted No 1113 68   Predicted No 1140 65 
Predicted Yes 60 7   Predicted Yes 53 14   Predicted Yes 60 10 
Recognized 9.21% Realized 10.45%     Recognized 17.07% Realized 20.90%     Recognized 13.33% Realized 14.29%   
2003 Actual No Actual Yes    2004 Actual No Actual Yes    2005 Actual No Actual Yes  
Predicted No 1042 52   Predicted No 1168 65   Predicted No 1235 63 
Predicted Yes 49 16   Predicted Yes 62 11   Predicted Yes 60 17 
Recognized 23.52% Realized 24.62%     Recognized 14.47% Realized 15.07%     Recognized 21.25% Realized 22.08%   
2006 Actual No Actual Yes    2007 Actual No Actual Yes    2008 Actual No Actual Yes  
Predicted No 1251 63   Predicted No 1373 74   Predicted No 1246 80 
Predicted Yes 62 17   Predicted Yes 73 14   Predicted Yes 68 12 
Recognized 21.25% Realized 21.52%     Recognized 15.91% Realized 16.09%     Recognized 13.04% Realized 15.00%   
2009 Actual No Actual Yes    2010 Actual No Actual Yes          
Predicted No 1393 76   Predicted No 1345 69         
Predicted Yes 77 15   Predicted Yes 73 15         
Recognized 16.48% Realized 16.30%     Recognized 17.85% Realized 17.05%           
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Table 4: Annual returns when removing predicted extreme movers 
This table presents the annual, value-weighted returns and the annualized standard 
deviation of daily returns, by year (in percentage terms), for two portfolios.  First, the full 
sample of firms is utilized which includes all firms with returns data, as well as data for all 
the predictors utilized in Tables 2 and 3.  In the second sample, all firms which are 
predicted to be extreme movement firms, based on the estimated coefficients of predictors 
from the previous year, are removed from the sample before returns and standard 
deviations are calculated. These are the firms predicted to have the highest 3% or lowest 
2.5% of returns or delist due to bankruptcy or bankruptcy-like reasons.  Predictions are 
based on coefficients from the probit regression of the prior year and the variable values 
from the last trading day of the previous year. The mean is the geometric mean of the 
annual returns.  
 
 
            All Firms      No Extreme Movers 
 
Difference 
 
Ret Ann SD Ret Ann SD 
 
Ret Ann SD 
1997 31.23 19.54 32.02 17.23 
 
0.79 -2.31*** 
1998 26.22 23.44 27.13 20.11 
 
0.91 -3.33*** 
1999 23.03 26.22 20.82 25.42 
 
-2.21 -0.80* 
2000 -10.22 24.12 -6.78 23.67 
 
3.44 -0.45 
2001 -11.32 27.73 -9.45 26.1 
 
1.87 -1.63*** 
2002 -24.15 21.04 -22.18 20.03 
 
1.97 -1.01** 
2003 29.87 20.44 26.68 18.45 
 
-3.19 -1.99** 
2004 7.23 18.77 8.34 17.82 
 
1.11 -0.95** 
2005 6.65 17.74 7.22 16.12 
 
0.57 -1.62*** 
2006 16.83 18.72 17.24 17.44 
 
0.41 -1.28** 
2007 4.56 22.03 5.72 20.14 
 
1.16 -1.89*** 
2008 -40.64 46.12 -40.02 44.92 
 
0.62 -1.20*** 
2009 28.11 47.70 27.87 47.26 
 
-0.24 -0.44 
2010 16.48 31.46 16.59 30.04 
 
0.11 -1.42*** 
Mean 4.99 26.08 5.70 24.63   0.71 -1.45*** 
 
*, ** and *** denote statistically lower annualized day-to-day standard deviation of returns at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5:  Directional Fama-Macbeth results 
This table presents coefficients and t-stats of the Fama-Macbeth procedure which conducts annual probit 
regressions of the likelihood of a firm being an extreme return firm.  Models are estimated separately for 
positive and negative extreme return predictions.  Firms in the highest 6% of equity returns are considered 
extreme positive return firms while firms in the lowest 5.5% of equity returns, or delisting for bankruptcy or 
bankruptcy-like reasons, are considered extreme negative return firms.  The sample period considers returns 
for 1997 through 2010 with predictor variables measured on the last trading day of the previous year.  BM is 
the book-to-market ratio, Disp is the analyst forecast dispersion, IV is the implied volatility of the call option 
closest to at-the-money expiring in February of the following year, Size is the log of firm size (in millions of 
dollars), Age is log of firm age in months, Vol is the log of the average number of shares traded daily in the 
previous year (in millions), RD is the research and development expense of firms in the previous year in 
millions of dollars, and Price is the log of firm price.   
 
  Positive   Negative 
  Coefficient t-value   Coefficient t-value 
Intercept -2.311 (-0.97)   -3.484 (-1.83) 
BM 2.773 (1.02)   0.621 (1.22) 
Disp -4.304 (-2.44)   1.577 (2.33) 
IV 1.932 (5.58)   3.552 (7.24) 
Size -0.405 (-2.48)   -0.158 (-2.52) 
Age -0.241 (-2.55)   -0.312 (-4.04) 
Vol 0.049 (1.32)   0.068 (1.72) 
RD -0.001 (-1.22)   -0.010 (-0.88) 
Price -0.085 (-0.44)   -0.084 (-0.32) 
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Table 6:  Prediction success for non-directional and directional models 
This table presents accuracy results for predicting firms that will have the highest 3% and lowest 2.5% of annual equity returns (or delist for 
bankruptcy or bankruptcy-like reasons) for two non-directional models.  One is the model of Table 3 and the other is the model of Table 3 excluding 
implied volatility as a predictor.    Results are also presented for positive and negative extreme return prediction models (using the predictive variables 
of the Table 3 model) separately which seek to identify the highest 6% and lowest 5.5% of annual equity returns (or delist for bankruptcy or 
bankruptcy-like reasons).  At the beginning of each year, the probit regression coefficients from the previous year are used to predict which firms will 
exhibit extreme returns in the following year. The percentage of extreme return firms that correctly were predicted to be so in the given year are 
classified as “recognized”.  The percentage of predicted extreme return firms that exhibit extreme price movements firms are classified as “realized”.   
Non-Directional Actual No Actual Yes 
Non-Directional      
(no IV) Actual No Actual Yes 
Predicted No 16,955 944 Predicted No 16,878 1,021
Predicted Yes 874 176 Predicted Yes 951 99
Recognized 15.71% Recognized 8.84%
Realized 16.76% Realized 9.43%
Positive Actual No Actual Yes Negative Actual No Actual Yes 
Predicted No 16,803 1,022 Predicted No 16,854 987
Predicted Yes 1,014 110 Predicted Yes 1,003 105
Recognized 9.72% Recognized 9.62%
Realized 9.79% Realized 9.48%  
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Table 7: Annual returns when removing predicted extreme negatives 
This table presents the annual, value-weighted returns and the annualized standard 
deviation of daily returns, by year (in percentage terms), for two portfolios.  First, the full 
sample of firms is utilized which includes all firms with returns data, as well as data for all 
the predictors utilized in Tables 2 and 3.  In the second sample, all firms which are predicted 
to be extreme negative movement firms, based on the estimated coefficients of predictors 
from the previous year, are removed from the sample before returns and standard deviations 
are calculated. These are the firms predicted to have the lowest 5.5% of returns or delist due 
to bankruptcy or bankruptcy-like reasons. Predictions are based on coefficients from the 
probit regression of the prior year and the variable values from the last trading day of the 
previous year. The mean is the geometric mean of the annual returns.  
 
 
            All Firms No Extreme Negative   Difference 
 
Ret Ann SD Ret Ann SD   Ret Ann SD 
1997 31.23 19.54 32.14 17.74   0.91 -1.80** 
1998 26.22 23.44 27.41 22.79   1.19 -0.65 
1999 23.03 26.22 19.85 26.78   -3.18 0.56 
2000 -10.22 24.12 -6.18 24.34   4.04 0.22 
2001 -11.32 27.73 -9.77 26.44   1.55 -1.29** 
2002 -24.15 21.04 -21.79 19.68   2.36 -1.36*** 
2003 29.87 20.44 28.02 18.91   -1.85 -1.53*** 
2004 7.23 18.77 9.03 18.44   1.80 -0.33 
2005 6.65 17.74 6.89 17.90   0.24 0.16 
2006 16.83 18.72 17.68 18.53   0.85 -0.19 
2007 4.56 22.03 5.67 22.34   1.11 0.31 
2008 -40.64 46.12 -39.82 46.01   0.82 -0.11 
2009 28.11 47.70 27.92 47.34   -0.18 -0.26 
2010 16.48 31.46 16.60 30.74   0.12 -0.72 
Mean 4.99 26.08 5.88 25.57   0.89 -0.50 
        *, ** and *** denote statistically lower annualized day-to-day standard deviation of returns at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
